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I. INTRODUCTION

To obtain habeas corpus relief in federal courts, a state prisoner
must demonstrate that his imprisonment violates the United States
Constitution.' A prisoner's valid constitutional objection to his incarceration may, however, fail because of several procedural doctrines
limiting the availability of habeas corpus relief. First, the federal
courts have held that certain constitutional defects, which would require reversal if found on direct appeal, will not justify issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus.2 Second, a prisoner's failure to raise a constitutional claim during the trial or appellate process may, notwithstanding the claim's merit, bar a subsequent assertion of that claim on
habeas corpus.' Finally, a prisoner's failure to assert a constitutional
objection in a previous habeas corpus proceeding may prevent later
consideration of the otherwise valid objection.4
*Several persons, none of whom bear any responsibility for this article, were kind enough
to comment on its first draft: my colleague Jerome C. Latimer; Ruthann Robson, a former
student; and Joseph A. Eustace, Jr., Michael A. Graves, Donald E. Horrox, Gregory L. Olney,
Michael S. Schwartzberg, and David M. Snyder, each of whom participated in a Stetson
University College of Law seminar on postconviction remedies. Special thanks go to Mr.
Eustace, who suggested the article's subtitle. I am also indebted to two student assistants,
Anthony J. Pannella and Kevin D. Fantuazzo.
**Associate Dean and Professor, Stetson University College of Law. B.A., Yale University;
J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M., University of Illinois.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982).
2. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (fourth amendment claims), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874
(1976). See infra text accompanying notes 25-38.
3. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See infra text accompanying notes 71-78.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 9(b) (1982) [hereinafter cited as Rule 9(b)]. See infra text at
notes 100-13.
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The wisdom of these limiting doctrines has been the subject of
much debate.5 This article, however, does not question their application in the typical noncapital habeas corpus case. Instead, it proposes
that federal habeas corpus courts should disregard these procedural
doctrines when the petitioner is a state prisoner under sentence of
death. The argument for this proposition is developed in two parts.
The first presents the general claim that, because "death is different," habeas corpus relief for capital prisoners should be different.
The second part examines the three limiting doctrines, discussing the
dangers inherent in their application and suggesting that federal
courts should discard these doctrines in death penalty cases.
II. UNIQUE STATUS OF DEATH AS PUNISHMENT

The United States Supreme Court's repeated evaluations of the
death penalty's constitutionality is indicative of the punishment's
special character.6 The Court took note of this unique status in Gardner v. Florida.7 The plurality opinion recognized that capital punishment is different from all other punishment both in severity and
finality." In light of the special character of the death penalty, the
5. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for narrow construction of
Rule 9(b)).
6. See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984); California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446
(1983); Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983); Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983);
Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420 (1980); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882
(1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
7. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
8. [Flive Members of the Court have now expressly recognized that death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country. From the
point of view of the defendant, it is different in both its severity and its finality. From
the point of view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its
citizens also differs dramatically from any other legitimate state action.
Id. at 357-58 (plurality opinion) (referring to Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and
Stevens) (citations omitted). Since the decision in Gardner,three more justices have indicated
their beliefs that the death penalty is different. Chief Justice Burger authored the prevailing
opinions in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978); Justice
White wrote the prevailing opinions in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), and Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); and Justice Blackmun joined the prevailing opinions in Coker,
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), and Enmund. Lockett, Bell, Coker, Enmund, and
Godfrey found individual death sentences unconstitutional in circumstances in which noncapital sentences would clearly have been permissible.
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Gardner plurality9 voided the trial judge's imposition of the death
penalty because the sentence was based, in part, upon the judge's
review of a presentence report that had not been fully disclosed to
the defense. 10 Although most authorities agree that the Constitution
does not require complete disclosure of presentence reports in noncapital cases," the Gardner plurality concluded that changing standards of procedural fairness required full disclosure in capital cases."2
These evolving standards of procedural fairness have compelled a
reexamination of other facets of the capital sentencing process.
Courts and legislatures have adopted different procedures not only
for reviewing capital sentences, but also for charging and trying capital defendants.' 3 Logically, different habeas corpus procedures are required as well.
Granting capital prisoners broader habeas corpus rights will prevent many executions, a result desirable to opponents of the death
penalty.' 4 But the merit of this argument does not depend on opposition to capital punishment. Other reasons support enhanced habeas
corpus relief for the condemned. The most significant is that the process resulting in an execution must be above reproach. No reasonable
9. Gardner, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). Justices Stewart and Powell joined Stevens' opinion.
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented on the basis of their opposition to the death penalty
but indicated agreement with the plurality's reasoning regarding disclosure of the presentence
report. Id. at 364 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 365 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices White
and Blackmun concurred in the result, implying general acceptance of the plurality's reasoning,
id. at 362-64 (White, J., concurring), id. at 364 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Chief Justice Burger
concurred in the judgment without opinion. Only Justice Rehnquist would have allowed the
sentence to stand. Id. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 362 (plurality opinion).
11. See Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States
District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 168, 193 (1966) ("It is not a denial of due process of law for a court
in sentencing to rely on a report of a presentence investigation without disclosing such report to
... ); cf. FED. R. CRM. P. 32(c)(3) (allowing trial judge to limit disclosure of
the defendant.
"any. . .information which, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to the
defendant or other persons"), discussed in ProposedAmendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts, 62 F.R.D. 271, 324-25 (1974).
12. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357 (plurality opinion).
13. Florida law is representative of this trend. The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
promulgated by the state supreme court, require that prosecutions for capital offenses begin
with a grand jury indictment. All other criminal cases may proceed on the basis of an information. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.140(a). Similarly, a jury of twelve must try capital cases in Florida,
while other criminal trials require a jury of only six. Id. at 3.270. The Florida Legislature has
directed appeals from capital convictions to the state supreme court; Florida's intermediate
appellate courts hear appeals from all other criminal convictions. FLA. STAT. § 924.08 (1983);
see FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3.
14. It is conceivable that an advocate of abolition of capital punishment could argue that
more, not fewer, executions are desirable, because frequent application of the death penalty will
turn the American public against capital punishment more quickly. The prediction of public
opinion that underlies this argument is dubious. Furthermore, the interim cost of pursuing the
suggested strategy is more than most opponents of capital punishment are willing to pay.
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suspicion that the state has executed an innocent person or one condemned to death by unconstitutional means can be tolerated. 15 In either case, the state's illegitimate killing of its own citizen weakens
respect for the law. This is the primary reason why jurisdictions imposing the death penalty accord capital defendants greater rights
before and during trial, as well as on appeal.1 6
Advocates of capital punishment may fear that enhancing the
habeas corpus rights of the condemned will delay their executions.
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist contended, in his dissent from the denial
of certiorari in Coleman v. Balkcom,' 7 that current federal habeas
corpus law "has made it virtually impossible for states to enforce
with reasonable promptness their constitutionally valid capital punishment statutes." Rehnquist felt that "when society promises to
punish by death. . ., and fails to do so. . ., the deterrent effect...
of capital punishment" and "the integrity of the entire criminal justice system" are both weakened."' For a number of reasons this view
is shortsighted.
First, delay in the imposition of capital punishment is unavoidable even absent habeas corpus relief. Preparation for a capital trial,
as well as the processes of appeal and application for executive clemency, is time-consuming.' 9 The courts should accept this inevitable
delay, using it to enhance respect for the capital punishment process
15. [S]urely those . . . who believe that there are circumstances in which the State
may legitimately impose this ultimate sanction would not want to see an innocent individual put to death. Certainly no [proponent of capital punishment] would countenance
a conviction obtained in violation of the Constitution. Because of the unique finality of
the death penalty, its imposition must be the result of careful procedures and must survive close scrutiny on post-trial review.
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 955, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 955 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
16. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
17. 451 U.S. 949 (1981).
18. Id. at 959 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see id. at 960 ("There
can be little doubt that delay in the enforcement of capital punishment frustrates the purpose
of retribution."). See generally Estelle v. Jurek, 450 U.S. 1014, reh'g denied, 451 U.S. 1011
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
19. Florida law is again representative. See supra note 13. A judge can suspend the strict
requirements of Florida's "speedy trial" rule if "exceptional circumstances are shown to exist,"
including the fact "that the case is so unusual and so complex, due to the number of defendants
or the nature of the prosecutionor otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate investigation or preparation within the [stated] periods of time." FLA. R. CraM. P. 3.191(f) (emphasis
added). There are no requirements of speed in disposing of appeals or of applications for executive clemency. In his concurrence in Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. at 951-52 n.5, Justice Stevens noted that John Spenkelink spent half of the six years between the day he murdered and
the date of his execution in the state court system. Cf. id. at 958 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (citing Spenkelink's execution as the only enforcement of the capital punishment laws against "a defendant who ... persisted in his attack upon his sentence" in the
preceding five years).
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by carefully examining every aspect of the defendant's case.
Second, the defendant does not go unpunished during this period
of delay. Responding to Justice Rehnquist's arguments, Justice Stevens wrote in his separate opinion in Coleman v. Balkcom 20 that the
time spent "between sentencing and execution is . . . a significant
form of punishment." Justice Stevens felt that the deterrent value of
that "period of uncertainly" might well be comparable to that "of the
ultimate step itself."' 21 In addition to the physical restraints imposed
upon those convicted of' noncapital crimes, Justice Stevens recognized that the condemned also suffers the psychological burdens of
impending but uncertain death. 22 Delaying execution does not, therefore, deprive the state of its opportunity to punish; it constitutes additional punishment.
The third and most important reason for countenancing delay in
the capital punishment process derives from what Justice Marshall
labels "the unique finality of the death penalty. ' 23 Execution, being
irreversible, should not occur until the courts are certain a prisoner's
conviction and sentence of death are correct and constitutionally
proper. As Justice Stevens noted in Coleman v. Balkcom, the state
must ensure that "novel procedural shortcuts" have not resulted in
constitutional error because "[t]he penalty, once imposed, is
24
irrevocable.
III. THE LIMITING PROCEDURAL DOcTRINES
Because of the unique nature of the death penalty, federal courts
should not deny relief to capital prisoners who can validly claim that
a conviction or sentence is constitutionally defective. Yet under current law courts may deny relief to a prisoner raising a valid constitutional claim under three circumstances. Relief may be denied if the
claim is not "cognizable" on habeas corpus, if the prisoner failed to
raise the claim at an appropriate time during his trial or appeal, or if
the prisoner failed to assert the claim in a previous petition for
20. 451 U.S. 949, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 955 (1981).
21. Id. at 952 (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). But cf. Barefoot v. Estelle,
103 S. Ct. 3383, 3391 (1983) ("[U]nlike a term of years, a death sentence cannot begin to be
carried out by the State while substantial legal issues remain outstanding.").
22. See Lewis, Mannle, Allen & Vetter, A Post-Furman Profile of Florida's Condemned-A Question of Discriminationin Terms of the Race of the Victim and a Comment
on Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 9 STETSON L. REv. 1 (1979). While "few inmates [on Florida's
death row] openly expressed much anxiety about their pending executions," 58% acknowledged
that they had considered suicide. Id. at 27-28. The psychological pressures of incarceration on
death row may explain (at least partially) the decision of some prisoners to seek speedy execution. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
23. Coleman, 451 U.S. 955 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
24. Id. at 953 (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
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habeas corpus relief.
A. Claims Not Cognizable on Habeas Corpus
In Stone v. Powell2 5 the Supreme Court sharply curtailed a state
prisoner's right to seek federal habeas corpus relief when the asserted
constitutional defect was a fourth amendment violation. The Stone
Court held claims of an unconstitutional search or seizure are cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding only if the state failed to
provide for full and fair litigation of the prisoner's claim. 6 Under
Stone, if the state courts allowed a defendant to litigate a fourth
amendment objection but incorrectly decided the issue against him,
and if the United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari, a
federal court hearing the defendant's plea for habeas corpus relief
would be powerless to intervene, regardless of the claim's merit. 8
Thus the Court explicitly mandated the denial of habeas corpus relief
to a prisoner with a valid objection to his conviction.
The precise rationale for the Stone holding is unclear. The basis
for the majority opinion appears to be the special constitutional status of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. The Court reasoned
the exclusionary rule is "not a personal constitutional right... calculated to redress the injury" to the defendant's privacy.29 Instead, it
is "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard. . ., through its
deterrent eifect," fourth amendment rights.3 0 The Court felt that, in
the habeas corpus context, the exclusionary rule's contribution to the
fourth amendment goals of deterring unreasonable searches and
seizures is small. Moreover, "the substantial societal costs" of the
rule's application, primarily letting the guilty go free, "persist with
special force." '
Justice Brennan's dissent, along with the Court's continued adherence to Mapp v. Ohio,32 undermines this explanation of the Stone
25. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
26. Id. at 482.
27. See id. at 536-37 (White, J., dissenting) (comparing the fortunes of two co-felons with
identical, valid fourth amendment claims that the state courts nevertheless reject- "Jones" obtains Supreme Court review, which results in his release; "Smith" does not and remain in
prison). The United States Supreme Court's inability to grant certiorari in all meritorious cases
is notorious. See Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
28. The lower federal courts have rejected the contention that an erroneous resolution of
the fourth amendment question constitutes deprivation of an opportunity for full and fair litigation. See, e.g., Swicegood v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1978).
29. Stone, 428 U.S. at 486.
30. Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).

31. Id. at 494-95; see also id. at 489-94.
32.

367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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v. Powell holding. Justice Brennan noted that, under Mapp, a state
court is required to exclude evidence from an individual's trial when
that evidence was acquired, directly or indirectly, by a search and
seizure in violation of the accused's fourth and fourteenth amendment rights. Therefore, if a state admits such evidence, it commits
constitutional error and the defendant's incarceration is a violation of
the Constitution within the meaning of the federal habeas corpus
statute.3" As long as the Court continues to read an exclusionary rule
into the fourth amendment,3 4 a prisoner's incarceration on the basis
of evidence obtained in violation of that amendment will justify the
granting of habeas corpus relief. According to Brennan, however, the
Court narrowed the scope of that relief in Stone v. Powell with its
novel reinterpretation of the habeas corpus statutes.35
The crucial factor in Stone v. Powell is, therefore, not the Court's
attitude toward the fourth amendment, but its conception of the
proper scope of habeas corpus relief. The Court's opinion does not
directly espouse this conception, but a concurring opinion written by
Justice Powell three years earlier does. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 6 Powell argued "the central reason for habeas corpus" is to
afford a means "of redressing an unjust incarceration" through an
extraordinary writ.3 7 Powell defined the justness of incarceration in
terms of the defendant's innocence. He explained that prisoners raising fourth amendment claims collaterally "usually are quite justly
detained" and the evidence obtained from these searches and
seizures is often highly reliable and clearly probative of guilt.38
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions considering the applicability
of the Stone reasoning to other constitutional claims raised on federal habeas corpus indicate that the Court has adopted Powell's concern about unjust incarceration but not his definition of injustice. In
two 1979 cases, Jackson v. Virginia3 9 and Rose v. Mitchell,0 the
Court rejected arguments that Stone barred considerations of the
prisoners' constitutional objections to their incarcerations. In Jackson, the petitioner claimed the state had failed to prove guilt beyond
33. Stone, 428 U.S. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. Cf. id. at 537 (White, J., dissenting) ("I feel constrained to say, however, that I would
join four or more other [J]ustices in substantially limiting the reach of the exclusionary rule as
presently administered under the Fourth Amendment in federal and state criminal trials.").
35. Id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
37. Id. at 257-58 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 258 (citing Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. RE V. 142, 160 (1970) (emphasis in original)).
39. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
40. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
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a reasonable doubt as required by In re Winship. 1 The Court found
Stone inapplicable because "[t]he question whether a defendant has
been convicted upon inadequate evidence is central to the basic question of guilt or innocence. "42 Thus, Jackson involved a claim of unjust incarceration within Justice Powell's definition in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte.
In Rose v. Mitchell, the Court considered a claim of racial discrimination in the selection of the foreman of the indicting grand
jury. Rose did not fall within Powell's definition because the defendants were convicted in a procedurally regular trial following the indictment. Justice Powell disagreed with the Court's refusal to follow
Stone.' The Court in Rose did not, however, reject unjust incarceration as the proper determinant of the scope of habeas corpus relief.
Instead, it adopted a broader concept of what makes incarceration
unjust. The Court repeatedly asserted that racial discrimination is
particularly pernicious in the administration of justice." The
"[s]election of members of a grand jury because they are of one race
and not another" the Court declared, "destroys the appearance of
justice and thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process."15 Incarceration based on the actions of a judicial system
tainted in this way can quite properly be branded unjust."
If Stone v. Powell's concept of the availability of federal habeas
corpus relief relies on injustice to the prisoner, and if injustice can
result from conditions other than innocence, it is not necessary to
apply Stone to the habeas corpus petitions of the condemned. While
it may not be unjust to incarcerate a clearly guilty defendant on the
basis of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, it does seem unjust to
take the defendant's life on the basis of such evidence. This is especially true when proper resolution of the search-and-seizure issue on
direct appeal would have barred the execution.
The injustice of applying Stone to the habeas corpus petition of a
prisoner sentenced to death is apparent in Zeigler v. State.7 At trial
the prosecution alleged that Zeigler killed his wife, his mother- and
father-in-law, and an acquaintance in the furniture store that Zeigler
41. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
42. 443 U.S. at 323.
43. Rose, 443 U.S. at 586-87 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Once a defendant is found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt by a fairly drawn petit jury, following a fair trial, he can hardly
claim that it was unjust to have made him stand trial.").
44. Id. at 555; see id. at 563, 564.
45. Id. at 555-56.
46. Rose further supported this argument by strongly distinguishing the taint of racial
discrimination in grand jury selection from the taint of an unconstitutional search and seizure.
Id. at 561-63.
47. 402 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982).
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owned. Then, according to the state, Zeigler shot himself and called
the police to the store in an effort to convince the authorities that the
acquaintance and other robbers were responsible for the shootings.48
The prosecution's case included evidence seized during a twelve-day,
warrantless search of the furniture store,49 and during two warrantless searches of Zeigler's home. The first occurred soon after Zeigler's
telephone call 50 and the second Zeigler consented to while hospitalized and under the influence of both an anesthetic and morphine.5 1
The trial judge rejected Zeigler's motions to suppress the evidence
obtained in these searches, citing the crime scene exception to the
warrant requirement to justify the search of the store, 52 the emergency exception to justify the first search of the home,53 and Zeigler's
consent to justify the second search of the home. 4 The jury found
Zeigler guilty of two counts of both first and second degree murder.
Refusing the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, the trial
judge sentenced Zeigler to death.5
The state supreme court affirmed the convictions and the sentence of death. The appellate court relied on the trial judge's reasoning to dispose of Zeigler's fourth amendment objections to the
searches of his home.5 8 For the search of the furniture store, however,
the court adopted a different rationale. The court upheld the
search, relying on an intervening United States Supreme Court decision which cast doubt on the applicability of the crime scene exception.58 Zeigler, the court reasoned, had consented to the search when
48. Id. at 367-68.
49. 455 U.S. 1035, 1035 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The
Florida Supreme Court, in denying Ziegler's objection to the search of the store, noted its duration only obliquely. The appellate court included a lengthy quotation from the trial judge's
findings, among which is the brief acknowledgment that the "crime scene investigation .
due to its complexity, continued for more than a week." 402 So. 2d at 371.
50. 402 So. 2d at 371.
51. 455 U.S. 1035, 1035 n.1 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Florida Supreme Court
mentioned none of these facts in its rejection of Zeigler's claim that the second search of his
home violated his fourth amendment rights.
52. See id. at 1037 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The trial court upheld the search [] under
th[e] crime scene rationale."). But cf. Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d at 372 ("[T]he trial judge did
not base his ruling on a construction of the Fourth Amendment. The. . . order reflects that the
basis of the ruling is the fact that defendant called the police to the store.").
53. Zeigler, 402 So. 2d at 371.
54. Id. See generally C. WHrrEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE chs. 8, 10 (2d ed. 1980) (discussion of consent and the emergency exception).
55. Zeigler, 402 So. 2d at 375. See generally FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1983) (outlines roles of
judge and jury in the sentencing of death or life imprisonment).
56. Zeigler, 402 So. 2d at 371.
57. See supra note 52.
58. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (disapproving warrantless search of murder
scene, which lasted four days).
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he called police for help. 59
Dissenting from the United States Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Zeigler, Justice Marshall"0 criticized the lower court's reasoning. To conclude "that a seriously wounded defendant who requests police aid thereby consents to an unlimited twelve-day search
of his business premises ignores the relevant context of the consent-the need for medical assistance-and amounts to a rule that a
cry for help waives all Fourth Amendment protection."6 1 Marshall
also questioned the justification of the second warrantless search of
Zeigler's home, characterizing the police behavior as "the extraction
of consent from a recuperating and drugged patient in a hospital
bed. '6 2 Application of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement to the first search of the home is also questionable."3
If the Court had granted certiorari in Zeigler and held that any of
the searches violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights,
Zeigler's conviction could have been reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial. The Court did not grant certiorari, however, and
Stone v. Powell prevents Zeigler from asserting his fourth amendment rights in seeking habeas corpus relief." Thus, even if a court
believed the searches were illegal and the conviction and death sentence unconstitutionally obtained, it would be powerless to stop
Zeigler's execution. 5
59. Zeigler, 402 So. 2d at 371-72.
60. Justice Brennan also dissented, on other grounds. See Zeigler, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
61. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The search of the furniture
store extended to Zeigler's locked office, where his desk was thoroughly examined, and to a
back room, where the police searched a closed storage cabinet. Id. at 1037.
62. Id. at 1036 n.1.
63. On the basis of the telephone call from the furniture store, the police dispatched men
to Zeigler's home. When no one answered their calls, the police entered the home "to determine
whether any foul play had occurred." Zeigler, 402 So. 2d at 371. The ensuing search disclosed a
gun found on the rear floor of an automobile parked in"Zeigler's garage. Id. Identifying such an
intrusive search as a reasonable reaction to an emergency situation seems extreme.
64. Zeigler could argue that the state supreme court's use of a rationale different from
that used by the trial court to justify the store search, see supra text at notes 56-58; but see
supra note 52, deprived him of the opportunity for full and fair litigation of his claim, see
supra text at note 26. See generally O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977)
(requirement of "opportunity for full and fair consideration" is satisfied when state court is
faced with fourth amendment claim and resolves claim on an independent state ground).
65. No currently reported decisions detail the treatment of Zeigler's fourth amendment
claims on federal habeas corpus; either he has not yet sought such relief, or the opinion considering his petition for relief is unreported. Nevertheless, because a number of federal courts have
mechanistically applied Stone to bar assertion of fourth amendment claims by condemned prisoners, see, e.g., Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940 (11th Cir. 1983); Stamper v. Baskervilie, 531 F.
Supp. 1122 (E.D. Va. 1982); cf. Smith v. Hopper, 240 Ga. 93, 239 S.E.2d 510 (1977) (state
habeas corpus proceeding applying Stone to condemned prisoner's search-and-seizure claim),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978), the result of Zeigler's pursuing his claims is apparent. But see
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To return a habeas corpus petitioner like Zeigler to death row, not
because his constitutional claim is invalid but because it is not "cognizable" on habeas corpus, is intolerable. To execute a prisoner with
a valid fourth amendment objection to his conviction because the
state courts did not see the merit of his claim and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari is unjust. Stone v. Powell limits habeas corpus only
when the prisoner cannot claim that his punishment is unjust. That
decision should not be applicable to the habeas corpus petitions of
those sentenced to death.
B. ProceduralDefault During Trial or Appeal
A state prisoner's failure to raise a constitutional claim during the
trial or appellate processes may sometimes, regardless of its validity,
prevent later assertion of that claim as a ground for federal habeas
corpus relief. The contours of this limiting doctrine are far from
clear.6 Federal courts generally hold that when the procedural default occurred before 7 or during68 trial, the prisoner must show cause
for the noncompliance as well as actual prejudice from the alleged
constitutional violation."' If the default occurred after trial, however,
the prisoner need only show that he did not "deliberately by-pass"
available procedures."
In Wainwright v. Sykes7 1 the Court justified the cause-andprejudice aspect of the procedural default rules on the basis of efficient use of judicial resources. The Court reasoned that the trial of a
criminal case in state court is "a portentous event. . . .Society's resources have concentrated" at the trial "in order to decide . . .the
question of guilt or innocence. . . . Any procedural rule which encourages" error-free results in those proceedings "is thoroughly desirable. ' 7 2 In order to assure that all the relevant issues are raised during the trial, federal courts considering petitions for writs of habeas
corpus should enforce state rules of procedure and refuse to hear
supra note 64.
66. See infra note 70.
67. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
68. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
69. Id. at 84. See generally Engel v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (discussing cause and
prejudice).
70. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). Arguably, the cause-and-prejudice standard has
wholly supplanted the deliberate bypass test, but this is a step the Supreme Court has "le[ft]
for another day." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88 n.12 (1977). Compare Tifford v. Wainwright, 588 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying deliberate bypass standard to default in appellate procedure), with Norris v. Wainwright, 588 F.2d 130 (5th Cir.) (applying cause-andprejudice test to appellate default), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979).
71. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
72. Id. at 90.
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claims that, according to those rules, should have been raised at or
before trial. The foregoing argument justifies, by analogy, the deliberate bypass aspect of the procedural default rules as well.73
Justice Brennan in his dissent in Wainwright v. Sykes argued for
a more relaxed rule of procedural default. This relaxed rule would
apply the deliberate bypass test to defaults at any stage of the criminal process, granting federal courts discretion to consider even bypassed claims.7 4 This liberal standard is necessary, according to Brennan, to avoid making the prisoner pay for trial counsel's
"inadvertence, negligence, inexperience, or incompetence," the usual
sources of procedural default.75 "Closing the.

. .

courthouse door" on

a prisoner because of unintentional errors by his lawyer is "a misdirected sanction." Even if the punishment encourages more thorough
trial preparation, the habeas applicant, as opposed to his lawyer,
"hardly is the proper recipient" of the penalty. 76 Only when the defendant himself has decided not to assert a particular claim is a refusal to consider the claim on a petition for habeas corpus proper. 7
Assuming that a prisoner victimized by his lawyer's procedural default has merely exchanged the defaulted claim for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is, while comforting, belied by the notoriously lax standards used for determining ineffective assistance. 7
Despite this reasoning, a majority of the Sykes Court chose a
more stringent standard of procedural default. While incarceration
may be the penalty for procedural default most likely to promote judicial efficiency, it seems excessive to execute a prisoner with a valid
constitutional objection simply because he or his lawyer failed to
raise a claim at the appropriate time. Such a rule of law purchases
efficiency at too high a price.
Spinkellink v. Wainwright 9 depicts the stark brutality of such a
rule of law. Condemned to death in state court, Spenkelink80 sought
73. The argument may indeed justify a more stringent rule of procedural default in the
appellate context. See supra note 70.
74. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 110-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 438.
75. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 116. While refusal to consider a prisoner's claim would be proper in such circumstances, Brennan apparently would not require refusal. See supra text accompanying note
74.
Brennan qualified this statement by adding that the defendant's "knowing and intelligent
participation" is necessary "where possible." 433 U.S. at 116. Chief Justice Burger considered
this qualification, which Justice Brennan did not elaborate upon, "an extraordinary modification" of previous understanding of the deliberate bypass standard. Id. at 94 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
78. Id. at 117-18.
79. 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
80. Id. Though it retained the style of the case used in the federal district court, the Fifth
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federal habeas corpus relief on numerous grounds. In response to
three of these claims, the state argued that Spenkelink's procedural
defaults barred consideration. Spenkelink's trial counsel had raised
one of the claims, that the exclusion of two veniremen because of
their aversion to the death penalty violated the principles established
in Witherspoon v. Illinois,s1 but failed to renew the claim on appeal.8 2 Consequently, the state argued, Spenkelink had lost the ability to raise the issue on federal habeas corpus. The other two claims,
that the state's indictment failed to indicate the aggravating circumstances justifying imposition of the death penalty8 3 and that the
prosecution used evidence obtained in violation of Brewer v. Williams 4 and Miranda v. Arizona,s5 were not raised even at trial. In
federal court, the state argued that these procedural defaults barred
consideration of the two issues.8 6
Noting that the state's procedural default argument regarding the
Witherspoon claim raised "difficult questions, 8 7 the Fifth Circuit
bypassed answering those questions by rejecting the claim on its merits. ss But the court cursorily accepted the state's contentions that
Spenkelink's procedural defaults on the indictment and confession issues disqualified the claims as grounds for federal habeas corpus relief. 9 Presuming these two claims valid and that the result of
Spenkelink's trial and sentencing hearing would have been different
had the claimed errors not been made, the inescapable conclusion is
that Spenkelink died because his lawyer failed to conform to state
procedural requirements. To exact such a penalty for any procedural
default is callous; to exact the ultimate penalty for a lawyer's proceCircuit pointed out that the correct spelling of the prisoner's name is "Spenkelink," not
"Spinkellink." Id. at 582 n.1.
81. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
82. Spinkellink, 578 F.2d at 591.
83. The court implied that this claim did not allege a violation of constitutional right:
"Spenkelink cites no case, federal or state, which requires the prosecutor to list in the indictment the aggravating circumstances on which he will rely in seeking the death penalty." Id. at
609.
84. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
85. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
86. Spinkellink, 578 F.2d at 609, 619.
87. Id. at 592. One difficult question is whether the cause-and-prejudice standard of
Sykes has replaced the deliberate bypass standard applied to procedural defaults on appeal in
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See supra note 70. The court also suggested that it would
have had difficulty deciding whether the circumstances of Spenkelink's default of appellate
procedure satisfied the cause-and-prejudice standard, if it were applicable. Spinkellink, 578
F.2d at 592.
88. Spinkellink, 578 F.2d at 592-99.
89. Id. at 609, 619-20. In support of its conclusions, the court cited Wainwright v.Sykes
and four Fifth Circuit opinions following Sykes. Id. at 609. Significantly, neither Sykes nor any
of the other cited opinions dealt with a prisoner condemned to death.
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dural default is truly monstrous.
Fortunately another federal appellate panel has shown greater regard for the special problems raised by the habeas corpus petitions of
condemned prisoners. In Jurek v. Estelle,e0 a different panel of the
Fifth Circuit assessed the Witherspoon claims of a prisoner sentenced to death. Responding to the state's argument of procedural
default, the Jurek court found cause for the default and prejudice
from the alleged violation. 91 In assessing cause, the court noted that,
considering the capital sentence, Jurek's interest "in vindicating his
federal right can scarcely be overstated. Under these circumstances a
court must search as assiduously as it can to find an excuse for a
procedural default, and must be prepared to consider a federal claim
whenever doing so will not seriously undermine the integrity of the
state's procedure. 9' 2 The court similarly held that Witherspoon vio-"
lations, which can occur only in trials resulting in capital sentences,
are necessarily prejudicial. 3
The court's recognition that capital sentencing liberalizes the procedural default standard is a laudable improvement on Spinkellink,
but the achievement of the Jurek court should not be overstated.
Jurek's trial lawyer came perilously close to providing ineffective assistance of counsel.9 4 Cause for the default in such circumstances
should not have been difficult to find, even without considering the
prisoner's capital sentence. Nevertheless, one member of the Jurek
court refused to join in the holding, 95 and when the Fifth Circuit
reheard the case en banc it granted relief without considering the
Witherspoon claim.9 6
Jurek v. Estelle is thus only a step in the right direction. Courts
judging the habeas corpus petitions of those under sentence of death
ought to adjudicate such claims without regard to procedural default. 7 Only then will constitutionally justifiable sentences be as90. 593 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979), modified en banc, 623 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1980) (reversing
district court's denial of habeas corpus relief on grounds free from any claim of procedural
default), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
91. Id. at 682-85. The court also questioned whether there had been a default of any
applicable procedural requirement. Id. at 681 n.15.
92. Id. at 684 n.25.
93. Id. at 684-85 (citing Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (per curiam)); cf. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516-18 (improper exclusion of venireman taints only capital sentence, not
criminal conviction).
94. Jurek, 593 F.2d at 682. Jurek's trial lawyer, in the court's opinion, "either was ignorant of the Witherspoon decision (then five years old) or completely misunderstood it." Id.
95. Id. at 686 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
96. Jurek, 623 F.2d at 943 n.8.
97. A possible criticism of such a rule is that it would encourage what the Sykes Court
labeled "sandbagging": "Tak[ing a] chance [ ] on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial court
constitutional claims in a federal habeas court if the [ ] initial
with the intent to raise ...
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sured; only then will society be certain that death is not the penalty
for failing to adhere to rules of criminal procedure.
C. Estoppel in Subsequent Habeas Corpus Proceedings
When a state prisoner presents a second petition for federal
habeas corpus relief, current law allows the court to short-circuit
analysis of the claims. If an adjudication of the claims on their merits
has previously occurred, the habeas corpus court may refuse reconsideration. Moreover, the court may refuse to hear claims that could
have been raised in the previous habeas corpus petition but were
not.98 A default in the preceding habeas corpus litigation can prevent
consideration of a claim on its merits, much as a procedural default
in the trial or appellate process can bar consideration. 9
Failure to raise a claim in one habeas corpus proceeding bars litigation of the claim in a later proceeding under rule 9(b) of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases. The rule indicates that a district
judge may dismiss a "second or successive petition" for habeas
corpus relief when, new or different grounds are alleged and the
judge finds that the petitioner's failure to assert those grounds earlier
constituted an abuse of the writ. 10 0 The rule does not define the term
"abuse of the writ."
In Rose v. Lundy,'01 the Supreme Court divided sharply over the
gamble does not pay off." Id. at 89. One may doubt that the temptation to sandbag would be
great, see id. at 103 & n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (sandbagger hurts his case at trial and on
appeal), especially when the opportunity to present the claim on federal habeas would be lost if
the jury convicted the defendant of a lesser included, noncapital offense or if the court refused
to impose capital punishment. But even if the incidence of sandbagging would be high, that
would be preferable to making death the penalty for such behavior.
98. Rule 9(b), supra note 4. For an unfortunate application of rule 9(b)'s previous adjudication principle to a prisoner under sentence of death, see Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 510 (1983), noted in Batey & Marks, Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 1983 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 35 MERCER L. REv. 1139, 1150-51 (1984).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 66-78.
100. Rule 9(b), supra note 4.
101. 455 U.S. 509 (1982). Lundy was an attempt to resolve the "mixed petition" problem,
one of the more vexatious questions arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1982), which requires that a prisoner exhaust available state remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus
relief. How should a federal court respond to a petition for habeas corpus relief that contains
both exhausted and unexhausted claims? Prior to Lundy, a majority of the federal circuits
allowed the district courts to consider the exhausted claims, while a minority forbade any federal consideration until all the prisoner's claims had been exhausted. See 455 U.S. at 513 n.5.
While indicating adherence to the minority position, id. at 518-19, the Lundy Court adopted a
rule that allows the habeas corpus petitioner to drop his unexhausted allegations of violation of
his constitutional rights and thereby obtain immediate federal review of his exhausted allegations. Id. at 510. The Court failed to decide, however, the issue its rule makes crucial: whether a
prisoner's decision to drop his unexhausted claims at this juncture prevents his subsequent
assertion of those claims after exhaustion? See infra notes 109 & 113.
Apart from its relationship to rule 9(b), the exhaustion requirement raises other issues
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term's definition. Four of the justices, led by Justice Brennan,0

2

ar-

9(b)10 s

gued that Congress intended rule
to codify the concept of
abuse of the writ as defined by past Supreme Court decisions. 04
These decisions, principally Sanders v. United States'05 and Smith
v. Yeager, 06s equated "abuse of the writ," in the context of failure to
raise a claim in a previous habeas corpus petition, with a deliberate
bypass of the relief available in a previous proceeding. 07 A federal

district court could, therefore, dismiss a successive petition raising a
new claim only if the court was convinced that the petitioner "intentionally relinquished a known right or privilege"'' 08 in the earlier
proceeding.10 9
Four other justices, led by Justice O'Connor,"° read the district
court's discretionary power more broadly. O'Connor's plurality opinion in Lundy dealt briefly with the rule 9(b) issue,"' suggesting that
when applied to a petitioner under sentence of death. Foremost among these is whether a federal habeas corpus court ought to ignore the exhaustion requirement in such a situation, as
some courts have done. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Townsend v. Twomey, 452 F.2d 350 (7th
Cir.) (citing Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944) (recognizing "exceptional circumstances" exception to exhaustion requirement)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972); United States ex rel.
Davis v. Henderson, 330 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. La. 1971). But see Chenault v. Stynchcombe, 581
F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1978).
102. Brennan's concurring and dissenting opinion in Lundy was joined by Justice Marshall. In separate opinions, Justices White and Blacknun indicated general agreement with
Brennan's analysis. Rose, 455 U.S. at 538 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 529 (Blacknun, J., concurring in the judgment).
103. Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-426, § 2(8), 90 Stat. 1334, 1335.
104. Rose, 455 U.S. at 534 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
language proposed to Congress, by an advisory committee acting under the authority of the.
Supreme Court, would have given judges the power to dismiss any claim in a successive petition
when the previous failure to assert the claim was "not excusable." See H.R. REP.No. 1471, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2478, 2485. Congress substituted the "abuse of the writ" terminology in rule 9(b), in order to bring the rule "into conformity with existing law." Id. at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2482.
105. 373 U.S. 1 (1963). See also Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
106. 393 U.S. 122 (1968) (per curiam) (prisoner sentenced to death). While Brennan's
opinion does not cite Smith, its relevance to the abuse-of-the-writ issue is unquestionable.
107. See id. at 125-26; Sanders, 373 U.S. at 17-18. Both decisions cited Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963), which in turn cited Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
108. 393 U.S. at 126 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
109. Applying this definition of "abuse of the writ" to the application of rule 9(b) to the
mixed petition problem, see supra note 101, Justice Brennan concluded that a habeas corpus
petitioner, who dropped his unexhausted claims because of the Lundy rule that he must do so
in order to obtain relief on his exhausted claims, should not be subject to a rule 9(b) motion
when he later presents his formerly unexhausted claims. "[T]he prisoner's 'abandonment' of his
unexhausted claims cannot in any meaningful sense be termed 'deliberate,' as that term was
used in Sanders. There can be no 'abandonment' when the prisoner is not permitted to proceed with his unexhausted claims." Rose, 455 U.S. at 537 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
110. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Retniquist joined the portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion dealing with rule 9(b).
111. Rose, 455 U.S. at 520-21 (plurality opinion).
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the deliberate bypass analysis of Sanders and Smith is not the only
way of establishing abuse of the writ." 2 The O'Connor plurality did
not indicate what other forms abuse of the writ might take," 3 though
a desire to liberalize proof of abuse is unmistakable.
However "abuse of the writ" under rule 9(b) is ultimately defined
by the Court, 1 4 the definition should be limited to habeas corpus
proceedings involving those sentenced to incarceration. It should not
apply to habeas corpus petitioners facing death sentences. Default in
a prior habeas corpus proceeding, like procedural default in the trial
or appellate process," 5 should not be punishable by death.
In Potts v. Zant,"6 the Fifth Circuit forcefully depicted the irrelevance of rule 9(b)'s abuse of the writ concept to habeas corpus petitioners sentenced to death. Condemned for the murder of his robbery-kidnap victim, Potts declined to pursue his postconviction
rights in the federal courts." 7 Fifteen hours before his scheduled execution, Potts authorized three attorneys to seek federal habeas
corpus relief on his behalf. Two days later, however, Potts wrote the
federal court asking to withdraw his petition." 8 Unwilling to rely on
Potts' letter, the district judge promptly held a hearing at which
Potts gave lengthy testimony expressing his desire not to delay his
execution."" The judge dismissed the petition.
Two weeks after this dismissal, and six days before Potts' rescheduled execution, the petition was refiled with an explanation that
Potts had withdrawn his prior petition due to depression resulting
112. Though Justice O'Connor did not draw this analogy, it is possible to compare the
treatment of default in a previous habeas corpus proceeding with the treatment of procedural
default at or before trial. See supra text accompanying notes 66-78. The result of such a comparison might be the definition of abuse of the writ as the absence of cause for the default or of
prejudice flowing from it.
113. Nor did the plurality specifically determine that dropping unexhausted claims in order to pursue exhausted ones necessarily constituted an abuse of the writ. See supra notes 101
& 109. But Justice O'Connor did cite approvingly Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239
(1924) (abuse of writ found where prisoner raised claim in previous habeas proceeding, and
withdrew it). See Rose, 455 U.S. at 521 n.13 (plurality opinion). "The present case . . .is not
controlled by Wong Doo. . . . Nonetheless, the case provides some guidance for the situation in
which a prisoner deliberately decides not to exhaust his claims in state court before filing a
habeas corpus petition." Id.
114. The issue apparently lies with Justice Stevens, whose opinion in Rose took no position on the question. See 455 U.S. 539 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 79-97.
116. 638 F.2d 727 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877 (1981), aff'g Potts v. Austin, 492 F.
Supp. 326 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
117. Id. at 729-30.
118. Id. at 730-31. "I beg of you to please let me withdraw the appeal as quickly a [sic]
possible! Let me get a date set immediately and most of all let me die while in a state of grace!"
Id. n.5.
119. Id. at 731-34. Potts indicated that he had agreed to file the petition primarily to
placate his brother. Id. at 732.
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from harassment by prison officers, discontent of family memebers at
the prospect of his continued incarceration, and the circus atmosphere surrounding his case.12 ° The district judge convened a hearing
the following day and heard arguments on whether the withdrawal of
the prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ. Although Potts
was prepared to present evidence on this issue, the district court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing. 121 That same day the court dismissed Potts' petition, finding that refiling the petition after its prior
withdrawal abused the writ of habeas corpus and therefore justified
dismissal. 22 Quoting Sanders, the court concluded, "[n]othing in the
traditions of habeas corpus review requires the federal courts to tolproceederate needless piecemeal litigation, or to entertain collateral
1 23
ings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay.
The Fifth Circuit granted a stay two days later and ultimately
reversed the district court. Over a brief dissent, the majority remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing focusing on first, whether
Potts' withdrawal of his prior petition was voluntary, and second,
whether the withdrawal, even if voluntary, constituted an abuse of
the writ. 2 4 Resolving the former issue, according to the Potts majority, required taking evidence on Potts' alleged reasons for withdrawing his first petition. 2 5
Whether the abandonment constituted an abuse of the writ also
required, for more subtle reasons, an evidentiary hearing. The Potts
majority concluded that "an intentional abandonment does not, by
itself, constitute an abuse."'1 26 In addition there must be bad faith, an
absence of good faith reasons for abandonment.1 27 In other words, a
120. Id. at 734. Regarding the discontent of his family, Potts alleged that "his mother was
displeased with his decisions to appeal and told him he had done the wrong thing by not going
through with the execution." Id. at 734 n.9a.
121. Id. at 735-36.
122. Id. "If ever there is a situation where a finding of an intentional abandonment of a
known right is demanded, this case presents it. By the same token, seeking another stay and
consideration of substantively identical petitions constitutes an abuse of the writ ... " Id.
123. Id. at 736 (quoting 373 U.S. at 18).
124. Id. at 747-48, 751.
125. Id. at 750-51. See infra note 129.
126. Id. at 747. See id. at 742-47.
127. The Fifth Circuit contrasted Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924), see
supra note 113, and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
In Wong Doo, the court found "[n]o reason for not presenting the proof at the outset," 265 U.S.
at 241, quoted in Potts, 638 F.2d at 745, from which fact the Sanders Court concluded that
Wong Doo had acted in bad faith, 373 U.S. at 10, cited in 638 F.2d at 745. On the other hand,
in Noia (which is relevant because of Sanders' adoption of Noia's deliberate bypass standard,
see supra note 107 and accompanying text), the defendant had forgone appellate review because he feared the death penalty on retrial. 372 U.S. at 397 n.3. The Potts majority construed
the Supreme Court's unwillingness to find a deliberate bypass in this situation as a holding that
adequate reasons for abandoning one's right to review, either appellate or collateral, rebut the
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court must evaluate the motives for the petitioner's previous default
before finding an abuse. 128 This evaluation also required an evidentiary hearing.12 9
The fact that Potts faced a death sentence did not enter into the
court's analysis until the penultimate section of its opinion. Noting
that habeas corpus courts have discretion to hear a petitioner's
claims even when an abuse of the writ has been found,'3 0 the Potts
majority pronounced that "the ends of justice may. . induce-and
may even require-the district judge to exercise his discretion to address the merits."'' The court elaborated on factors making a hearing on the merits despite an abuse of the writ necessary. "The fact
that a man's life is at stake is relevant. Also relevant is the fact that
Potts would be executed without ever having had any federal review
of the merits of the alleged constitutional defects in his conviction
and sentence."' 1 2
Despite the strong implication of its discussion of "the ends of
justice," the majority opinion left consideration of these factors to
the district court on remand.3 3 Specially concurring Judge Clark indicated he "would go further and require a hearing on the merits because. . . the ends of justice overwhelmingly compel" one. 13 Balancing the basic considerations, "on the one hand the possibility of
intent to vex, harass, and delay-on the other, death by electrocution
without determining if the prisoner was deprived of his rights,"' 3 5
presumption of bad faith arising from the abandonment and thereby rebut the contention of
deliberate bypass or abuse of the writ. 638 F.2d at 744 (quoting 372 U.S. at 399, 439, 440).
128. The concurring opinion in Potts characterized the required finding as one of "specific intent to vex, harass, or delay." 638 F.2d at 753 (Clark, J., concurring). See supra text
accompany note 123.
129. 638 F.2d at 747, 748-49. Arguably, the court's evidentiary issues raised only a single
question: Were the factors that led Potts to withdraw his first petition sufficiently exigent to
relieve him of responsibility for that choice? Such an inquiry can be phrased either as a test of
voluntariness or as an examination of the prisoner's good faith in making the choice. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963), see supra note 127, is susceptible to these alternative analyses.
130. Potts, 638 F.2d at 751-52. See supra text accompanying note 100.
131. 638 F.2d at 752 (citing Sanders, 373 U.S. at 18-19).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 753 (Clark, J., specially concurring). Judge Clark also would have found, without further hearings on the matter, that Potts had not abused the writ:
[T]he record clearly reflects a tortured and vacillating mental state that has bent to
differing pressures from his brother, his mother, his attorneys, and the news media, not
to consider the alleged maltreatment in prison.... One cannot truly be surprised that
the prisoner at one time wanted to hurry his own execution and at another time wanted
to live and seek relief for claimed deprivation of constitutional rights.
Id.
135. Id.
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Judge Clark concluded that a hearing was required "under these extreme circumstances."' 13 6
When the prisoner petitioning for habeas corpus relief faces a
death sentence, Judge Clark's approach to the abuse-of-the-writ
problem seems sensible. To allow the prisoner's execution without inquiry into the reasons for his previous default is barbarous. This approach condemns the prisoner with a valid constitutional claim because he or his lawyer, for personal or practical reasons, made a poor
choice. To require an evidentiary hearing on the reasons for the default 37 is wasteful. The time consumed in holding the hearing and in
adjudicating and appealing its results would be better spent in deciding the merits of the petitioner's claim. The option advocated by
Judge Clark in his Potts concurrence, to "fully consider the prisoner's
constitutional claims," ' should be adopted:
To do otherwise would always leave unanswered the questions-Did [the prisoner] intend to vex, harass, and delay?
Was [he] deprived of any of his federal constitutional rights?
Was it appropriate to take his life by answering the first question yes and avoiding an answer to the latter question? The
price of granting a 1full
hearing is too small when balancing
39
these considerations.

When the Supreme Court ultimately resolves the meaning of
"abuse of the writ" in rule 9(b), it is unlikely to choose a definition as
broad as that adopted by the Potts majority.

40

Whatever definition

is chosen, however, an exception for capital prisoners sentenced to
death should be included.1 41 A default in a previous habeas corpus
proceeding should not prevent a capital prisoner from obtaining an
adjudication on the merits of his constitutional claims. 42
136. Id.
137. It appears immaterial whether the hearing inquiries into the voluntariness or the
good faith of the prior default. See supra note 129.
138. Potts, 638 F.2d at 753 (Clark, J., specially concurring).
139. Id.
140. Potts' holding that more than an intentional abandonment is necessary for abuse,
see supra text accompanying notes 126-29, goes beyond the position of Justice Brennan, who
equated intentional abandonment with abuse, see supra text accompanying notes 102-09, and
substantially outdistances Justice O'Connor's suggestion that abuse can occur even in the absence of intentional abandonment, see supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
141. The courts can either read such an exception into the concept of abuse of the writ or
hold that the "ends of justice," see supra note 131 and accompanying text, require hearing the
petitions of the condemned, notwithstanding their abuse of the writ. Judge Clark's concurrence
in Potts supports either conclusion. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36. But see Antone
v. Dugger, 104 S. Ct. 962, 965 (1984) (applying rule 9(b) in a capital case).
142. One criticism of such an exception to rule 9(b) is that it would encourage "piecemeal
litigation... whose only purpose is... delay." Sanders, 373 U.S. at 18. See supra text ac-
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IV. CONCLUSION
No procedural impediment should stand between the prisoner
sentenced to death and the federal habeas corpus courts. The function of habeas corpus in capital punishment cases, to assure government imposes its most severe penalty only after a constitutionally
satisfactory determination that the punishment is justified, is too important to be frustrated by issues that fail to go to the merits of the
prisoner's complaint. Society will rest easier knowing the state has
killed only after justification of this action by a procedure beyond
constitutional reproach.

companying note 122. Delay has an obvious value to the condemned.
A number of responses to this criticism are possible. First, considering the anxiety of being
on death row, see supra text accompanying notes 21-22, it is unlikely that a prisoner would
forgo the present assertion of a claim which, if successful, would relieve him of that anxiety.
Secondly, delay is inevitable, even without the suggested exception. See supra text accompanying note 19. Resolution of the rule 9(b) issue will itself cause much delay, especially if evidentiary hearings are necessary. See supra text accompanying note 137. Thirdly, even if there is
delay, the state will still have paid a very small price for assuring the constitutionality of its act
of taking a human life.
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